PREFACE

　　The definite object proposed in this work is an examination of the general history of Europe and America with particular reference to the effect of sea power upon the course of that history. Historians generally have been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither special interest nor special knowledge; and the profound determining influence of maritime strength upon great issues has consequently been overlooked. This is even more true of particular occasions than of the general tendency of sea power. It is easy to say in a general way, that the use and control of the sea is and has been a great factor in the history of the world; it is more troublesome to seek out and show its exact bearing at a particular juncture. Yet, unless this be done, the acknowledgment of general importance remains vague and unsubstantial; not resting, as it should, upon a collection of special instances in which the precise effect has been made clear, by an analysis of the conditions at the given moments.

　　A curious exemplification of this tendency to slight the bearing of maritime power upon events may be drawn from two writers of that English nation which more than any other has owed its greatness to the sea. Twice, says Arnold in his History of Rome, Has there been witnessed the struggle of the highest individual genius against the resources and institutions of a great nation, and in both cases the nation was victorious. For seventeen years Hannibal strove against Rome, for sixteen years Napoleon strove against England; the efforts of the first ended in Zama, those of the second in Waterloo. Sir Edward Creasy, quoting this, adds: One point,

　　前 言

　　本書有著一個確切的目標，那就是具體地根據(jù)海權(quán)對歷史進程的影響，來審視歐洲和美洲的概史。史學家們通常都不熟悉海洋的情況，他們對海洋既無特殊興趣，也無專業(yè)知識；因此，海權(quán)對于一些重大問題所起的深刻而具有決定性的影響，往往就被他們忽略了。對于某些具體戰(zhàn)例與海權(quán)總體的發(fā)展趨勢而言，具體戰(zhàn)例甚至更符合這種情況。泛泛而談，說利用和控制海洋是而且一直是世界歷史的一個重要因素，做到這一點并不難；但找出并說明它在某一具體時刻的準確影響，卻要棘手得多。然而，不這樣做的話，我們對海權(quán)整體重要性的認可，就是含糊而空洞的；因為我們本來應當是以一系列特定的、清晰地顯示出海權(quán)準確影響的戰(zhàn)例為基礎(chǔ)，并且在分析了某一特定時刻的形勢之后，才能進行此種認可的。

　　從英格蘭民族的兩位史家身上，即可以看出人們忽視海上力量影響歷史事件的這種古怪傾向英格蘭民族之偉大，比其他任何民族都更可歸因于海洋。阿諾德［1］在其《羅馬史》中曾說：歷史已經(jīng)見證過，有兩位重要的個人天才，曾經(jīng)與兩個偉大國家的資源和制度進行斗爭；而在這兩次斗爭中，終都是國家獲勝。漢尼拔與羅馬斗爭了17年，拿破侖與英國斗爭了16年；前者付出了努力，卻在扎馬［2］折戟，而后者則在滑鐵盧敗北。愛德華·克里西勛爵在引用了這種說法之后，又進一步說：然而，這

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　　however, of the similitude between the two wars has scarcely been adequately dwelt on; that is, the remarkable parallel between the Roman general who finally defeated the great Carthaginian, and the English general who gave the last deadly overthrow to the French emperor. Scipio and Wellington both held for many years commands of high importance, but distant from the main theatres of warfare. The same country was the scene of the principal military career of each. It was in Spain that Scipio, like Wellington, successively encountered and overthrew nearly all the subordinate generals of the enemy before being opposed to the chief champion and conqueror himself. Both Scipio and Wellington restored their countrymens confidence in arms when shaken by a series of reverses, and each of them closed a long and perilous war by a complete and overwhelming defeat of the chosen leader and the chosen veterans of the foe.

　　Neither of these Englishmen mentions the yet more striking coincidence, that in both cases the mastery of the sea rested with the victor. The Roman control of the water forced Hannibal to that long, perilous march through Gaul in which more than half his veteran troops wasted away; it enabled the elder Scipio, while sending his army from the Rhone on to Spain, to intercept Hannibals communications, to return in person and face the invader at the Trebia. Throughout the war the legions passed by water, unmolested and unwearied, between Spain, which was Hannibals base, and Italy, while the issue of the decisive battle of the Metaurus, hinging as it did upon the interior position of the Roman armies with reference to the forces of Hasdrubal and Hannibal, was ultimately due to the fact that the younger brother could not bring his succoring reinforcements by sea, but only by the land route through Gaul. Hence at the critical moment the two Carthaginian armies were separated by the length of Italy, and one was destroyed by the combined action of the Roman generals.

　　On the other hand, naval historians have troubled themselves little about the connection

　　兩場戰(zhàn)爭相似性當中的一點，卻并未得到充分的強調(diào)；那就是，終擊敗了這位迦太基偉人的羅馬將軍，與終給予法蘭西皇帝以致命一擊的那位英國將領(lǐng)之間，具有顯著的相似性。西庇阿［3］與威靈頓［4］二人，雖說都曾身居高位數(shù)年，卻都根本沒有到過主戰(zhàn)場。而二者主要的軍事成就，也是在同一個國家取得的。西庇阿在西班牙時，跟威靈頓公爵一樣，是在相繼遭遇并且打敗了敵人差不多所有的下級將領(lǐng)之后，才去面對敵軍主帥或征服者本人的。西庇阿與威靈頓公爵二人，都在同胞遭遇了一系列挫折而產(chǎn)生動搖之后，重新讓這些同胞恢復了對本國武裝的信心，并且二者都是通過徹底而壓倒性地擊敗了敵人的精兵強將，從而結(jié)束了一場曠日持久、危險可怕的戰(zhàn)爭。

　　不過，這兩位英國人都沒有提及一種更為顯著的一致性，那就是：獲勝的一方控制了海洋。羅馬人控制了水上，迫使?jié)h尼拔不得不經(jīng)由高盧進行遙遠而危機四伏的行軍，從而令其手下身經(jīng)百戰(zhàn)的部隊損失過半；這也使得大西庇阿既能夠讓軍隊從羅納河沿河而上前往西班牙，以切斷漢尼拔的交通運輸，同時還能親自返回來，在特雷比亞面對入侵者。在整個戰(zhàn)爭期間，羅馬軍團都是經(jīng)由水路，不受襲擾且毫不疲憊地往來于西班牙和意大利之間，可西班牙本來卻是漢尼拔的大本營；而梅陶羅決戰(zhàn)，則取決于羅馬國內(nèi)的軍隊對哈斯德魯巴［5］與漢尼拔所率軍隊的態(tài)度，且終原因還是在于漢尼拔的這位弟弟無法從海路帶來援兵，只能經(jīng)由高盧的陸路對其進行增援的事實。在如此關(guān)鍵的時刻，迦太基的兩支軍隊卻被長長的意大利分割開來，于是其中一支就被羅馬將領(lǐng)們聯(lián)合起來消滅了。

　　另一方面，研究海軍的歷史學家們，卻又很少努力去了解普通歷史與他們所研究專

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　　between general history and their own particular topic, limiting themselves generally to the duty of simple chroniclers of naval occurrences. This is less true of the French than of the English; the genius and training of the former people leading them to more careful inquiry into the causes of particular results and the mutual relation of events.

　　There is not, however, within the knowledge of the author any work that professes the particular object here sought; namely, an estimate of the effect of sea power upon the course of history and the prosperity of nations. As other histories deal with the wars, politics, social and economical conditions of countries, touching upon maritime matters only incidentally and generally unsympathetically, so the present work aims at putting maritime interests in the foreground, without divorcing them, however, from their surroundings of cause and effect in general history, but seeking to show how they modified the latter, and were modified by them.

　　The period embraced is from 1660, when the sailing-ship era, with its distinctive features, had fairly begun, to 1783, the end of the American Revolution. While the thread of general history upon which the successive maritime events is strung is intentionally slight, the effort has been to present a clear as well as accurate outline. Writing as a naval officer in full sympathy with his profession, the author has not hesitated to digress freely on questions of naval policy, strategy, and tactics; but as technical language has been avoided, it is hoped that these matters, simply presented, will be found of interest to the unprofessional reader.

　　A. T. MAHAN

　　December, 1889.

　　題之間的聯(lián)系，通常都只讓自己成為海軍歷史事件的簡單記錄者。對于這一點，法國史學家的情況并不像英國的史學家那樣；因為法蘭西民族的天賦和法國史學家所受的訓練，使得他們能夠更加細心地去探究特定事件的前因后果，以及各個事件之間的相互關(guān)系。

　　然而，據(jù)筆者所知，還沒有哪一部著作闡述了此處我們所要探究的這個特殊目標；也就是說，評估海權(quán)對歷史進程和各國繁榮的影響。由于其他歷史科目在研究戰(zhàn)爭、政治以及各國的社會與經(jīng)濟狀況時，對海洋事件都只會順帶涉及，并且通常都是淡然置之，所以本書之目標，便是將海洋利益推向前臺，但又不將它們與普通歷史的因果環(huán)境割裂開來，而是力圖表明它們?nèi)绾胃淖兞似胀�歷史的因果環(huán)境，以及它們是如何被普通歷史的因果環(huán)境所改變的。

　　本書所選的時間段，是從具有顯著特征的帆船時代已然開始的1660年，到美國革命結(jié)束時的1783年。雖說維系接連發(fā)生的那些海洋事件的普通歷史線索都被人們有意地忽略掉了，但本書還是想努力為它們呈現(xiàn)出一個清晰而不失準確的輪廓來。作為一名對自己的職業(yè)深有感觸的海軍軍官，筆者在寫作本書時，會毫不猶豫、自由自在地去探究那些與海洋軍事政策、戰(zhàn)略以及戰(zhàn)術(shù)相關(guān)的問題；不過，本書略去了一些太過專業(yè)的術(shù)語，寄望這些簡單平實地呈現(xiàn)出來的事情，能夠引起非專業(yè)讀者的興趣。

　　阿爾弗雷德·塞耶·馬漢

　　1889年12月